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This article develops a sectoral approach to the analysis of global climate governance. This approach
advances the assessment of global climate governance by focusing on complexes of intergovernmental
and transnational institutions co-governing key socio-technical sectoral systems. The actual and po-
tential contribution of these sectoral institutional complexes to advancing decarbonization can be
assessed according to five key governance functions: (1) providing guidance and signal to actors, (2)
setting rules to facilitate collective action, (3) enhancing transparency and accountability, (4) offering
support (finance, technology, capacity-building), and (5) promoting knowledge and learning. On this
basis, we can assess the potential of international cooperation to address the challenges specific sectoral
systems face in the climate transition as well as the extent to which existing sectoral institutional
complexes deliver on this potential. This provides a solid starting point for developing options for filling
identified gaps and enhancing the effectiveness of global climate governance.
© 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Global governance (used here to encompass transboundary
cooperation of various actors spanning from the regional to the
global) has an important role to play in the fight against climate
change and in advancing worldwide decarbonization. Action on
climate change has been taken at different levels of governance and
by various actors, including cities, firms, civil society, national
governments, as well as supra- and international organisations
(UNFCCC, 2019; Hsu et al., 2018). Such action does not always and
necessarily require international cooperation. However, global
governance can frequently and to varying degrees facilitate and
accelerate action. It is hence widely seen as an essential part of
adequately addressing climate change (IPCC, 2014).
The record of global climate governance, however, is mixed, if
not dismal. As their number has grown, both intergovernmentalies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
erthür).
n open access article under the CC(including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change e
UNFCCC, and others) and transnational (involving private, non-
governmental actors) institutions and initiatives, in which a wide
variety of actors cooperate to address climate change, have come
into focus (e.g., Keohane and Victor, 2011; Abbott, 2012; Bulkeley
et al., 2014; Graichen et al., 2016; Sanderink et al., 2017; van der
Ven et al., 2017; Hsu et al., 2018). Although this literature has
focused especially on the effectiveness of these institutions, either
individually or jointly, in addressing greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions, the ability of this evolving ‘polycentric climate governance’ to
deliver on the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature target
remains in doubt (Jordan et al., 2015, 2018). Lack of progress in
reducing GHG emissions e due to insufficient ambition of ‘Na-
tionally Determined Contributions’ (NDCs) under the Paris Agree-
ment and grave implementation deficits (UNEP, 2020) e nourishes
these doubts. This special issue contributes to systematically
assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of global climate gover-
nance in advancing climate mitigation so as to limit the increase of
global average temperature to well below 2 C or even 1.5 C,
compared to preindustrial levels, in accordance with the 2015 Paris
Agreement.BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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effectiveness and adequacy of the global climate governance
landscape. Inadequate global governance is not the only culprit for
the insufficient progress of the zero-carbon transformation of our
economies and societies (henceforth, ‘the climate transition’).
However, global governance has its specific potential that policy-
makers should be concerned to maximize. That being so, several
questions may be asked: What precisely is this potential and to
what extent does it need to be exploited for advancing the climate
transition? To what extent does global governance allow key bar-
riers to this transition to be addressed? Has it realised its potential?
While much of the existing literature has taken problem solving as
its benchmark (e.g., Young, 2011), it has not systematically assessed
the potential of global governance to address climate change and
the extent to which this potential has been exploitede the areas on
which we aim to shed light in this special issue.
To this end, this article and special issue develop and apply a
sectoral approach to the analysis of global climate governance. We
hold that barriers to the climate transition as well as the potential of
and need for global governance to address them vary across
different sectoral systems. They are hence best analyzed at a more
focused, sectoral level (rather than in general) (see also Victor et al.,
2019). We therefore argue for the added value of focusing the
analysis on sectoral institutional complexes structuring what is
otherwise a rather amorphous global climate governance land-
scape. Doing so provides a structured and focused way to identify
underexploited governance potentials and possibilities to enhance
the contribution of global governance to an effective climate tran-
sition. While a sectoral approach is not necessarily superior, we
argue that it advances our understanding of the adequacy of global
climate governance and facilitates identifying related potentials for
improvement (as further developed in section 2). It thereby also
offers away towards exploring the differentiated structure of global
climate politics beyond its modeling as a global collective action
problem, as has been demanded in recent literature (Aklin and
Mildenberger, 2020; Hale, 2020).
Our approach goes beyond previous discussion of sectoral ap-
proaches in global climate governance. Sectoral approaches to
mitigating GHG emissions were debated in the literature and in
policymaking especially in the 2000s (e.g., Baron et al., 2007;
Meckling and Chung, 2009; Sawa, 2011). Closely linked to the
multilateral climate regime, these discussions were very much
driven by political demands to expand international mitigation
obligations/actions particularly to more advanced developing
countries under a burden-sharing paradigm. Accordingly, the focus
was on possible agreements on bindingmitigation commitments at
least for some sectors such as electricity generation and heavy in-
dustry with a view to creating a more level playing field. While
using similar terminology, our proposed sectoral approach goes
beyond the earlier discussions by taking as a different starting point
that our entire economic systems require fundamental trans-
formation which requires addressing sector-specific challenges.
Our analysis focuses on the international level. While it thereby
makes a contribution to the understanding of ‘polycentric’ climate
governance (Ostrom, 2010; Jordan et al., 2015, 2018), it does not
fully incorporate the multi-level perspective that the concept of
polycentricity entails. Our analysis hence focuses on a significant
part of polycentric climate governance as we address international,
transboundary cooperation and governance, while we leave
exploration of, and interaction with, other levels of polycentric
governance to future research (see also Rayner et al., this special
issue).
We develop our argument in the following steps. Section 2 first
introduces sectoral institutional complexes composed of interna-
tional (i.e., intergovernmental and transnational) institutions as our2
key units of analysis. Section 3 then establishes five key governance
functions which international institutions may in principle perform
(guidance and signal, rule-setting, transparency and accountability,
means of implementation, and knowledge and learning). These
enable a systematic analysis of the potential and actual contribu-
tion of international institutions to advancing the climate transition
of sectoral systems. We subsequently discuss our approach’s limi-
tations (section 4), before introducing its operationalisation in the
sectoral case studies and providing an overview of the other con-
tributions to the special issue.
2. Sectoral institutional complexes as units of analysis
We suggest focusing on sectoral institutional complexes as units
of analysis that are composed of various international institutions
and form part of broader governance landscapes comprising
several sectoral complexes. Building on relevant literature, this
section introduces this focus by first introducing intergovern-
mental and transnational institutions as the main fora of global
governance that form broader institutional complexes and gover-
nance landscapes. On this basis, we introduce sectoral institutional
(sub-)complexes as the core of our sectoral approach.
2.1. International institutions and institutional complexes
International institutions form the principal fora of global
governance. Global governance can be understood as the steering
of actors’ behaviour through the setting of rules, standards and
guidelines, or through targeted support, towards a common or
shared goal (see Roger et al., 2017: 5e6). International institutions
that actors have purposively created through negotiations provide
such governance since they establish systems of rules and practices
that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape actor
expectations (Young, 1982, 1989; Keohane, 1989; North, 1991;
Simmons and Martin, 2002). In contrast, regularities and practices
that emerge from the uncoordinated behaviour of actors in the
international system (‘spontaneous institutions’: Young, 1982) do
not constitute governance instruments. The international gover-
nance institutions of interest here generally have two principal
components: (1) substantive rules and norms that can prescribe,
proscribe, permit or direct relevant behaviour of states and other
actors with respect to the issue at stake (climate change, world
trade, etc.); and (2) procedural rules for making and implementing
decisions (including on substantive rules), thereby providing fora
for exchange, deliberation and decision-making (Young, 1980;
Gehring, 1994). Accordingly, we include in our analysis of global
climate governance more or less formal intergovernmental and
transnational institutional arrangements that fulfil the resulting
minimum requirements of possessing a normative core and joint
decision-making procedures towards a common purpose, while
being relatively lasting. In the following we refer to such arrange-
ments as ‘international institutions.’
International institutions traditionally comprise two types of
intergovernmental governance arrangements. First, formal interna-
tional organisations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), or the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) usually arise from intergovernmental agree-
ments establishing the statutes of the organization. They possess
the qualities of actors, including a physical location (‘a seat’), a staff
of employees (secretariat) and usually legal personality (Young,
1986). Second, international regimes serve to govern specific
issue areas usually on the basis of intergovernmental treaties, as
further developed through subsequent decision-making by the
parties. Hence, the climate change regime rests on the UNFCCC, the
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement ewhich have been fleshed
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While lacking some formal qualities of international organisations
(seat, statutes, legal personality), they are regularly served by sec-
retariats (that can be self-standing, as in the case of the UNFCCC
Secretariat, or hosted by international organisations) (Levy et al.,
1995). The ongoing debate over the conceptual and empirical
dividing line between international organisations and regimes can
be left aside for our purposes, since we in any event include both
types of intergovernmental institutions.
We expand the traditional focus on formal intergovernmental
institutions in two respects. First, the enhanced role of non-state
actors such as firms, civil society organisations and local author-
ities (cities, municipalities, regions) in international politics more
generally has given rise to transnational institutions involving such
actors. Transnational institutions include a fully private form run
exclusively by non-state actors, as well as a hybrid variety operated
by both non-state and state actors/governments. Transnational
institutions have reached particular prominence in global climate
governance with the growth of ‘international cooperative initia-
tives’ and various transnational networks (such as city networks,
private certification initiatives, etc.; see Andonova et al., 2009;
Abbott, 2012; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Abbott et al., 2016; Sanderink
et al., 2017).
Second, we include intergovernmental and transnational ar-
rangements below the threshold of formal organisations or regimes
(such as the G20, various partnerships and international coopera-
tive initiatives). In the wake of debates on polycentric (climate)
governance, it has become increasingly acknowledged that such
less formal arrangements constitute significant instruments of
global governance (Ostrom, 2010; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Jordan et al.,
2015). However, such relatively informal arrangements need to
fulfil certain minimum requirements in order to qualify as inter-
national governance institutions. In line with the aforementioned
understanding of governance institutions, they need to aim at
realising a common purpose, possess a consequential normative
core (through jointly setting and developing rules, standards and
guidelines, or providing targeted support), be lasting, and have
procedures for joint decision-making (for a further elaboration of
relevant governance functions, see section 3). This understanding
should help avoid confusing international governance institutions
with various international coalitions and lobby groups as well as ad
hoc fora, platforms, projects, programmes and networks. For
example, neither the International Chamber of Commerce as a
lobby group nor the ‘high-ambition coalition’ that was instru-
mental for bringing about the Paris Agreement fulfil the criteria of
an international governance institution.
For any policy field, sub-field or sector, several institutions will
usually operate and interact to form institutional complexes.
Hence, Keohane and Victor (2011) have identified a regime complex
on climate change including a host of primarily intergovernmental
fora (such as the Montreal Protocol addressing fluorinated GHGs,
various minilateral fora and others). As a key ingredient of ‘poly-
centric’ (climate) governance (Ostrom, 2010; Jordan et al., 2015,
2018), institutional complexes constitute networks of three ormore
international institutions that relate to a common subject matter;
exhibit overlapping membership; and generate interactions in
rulemaking or implementation (Orsini et al., 2013; see also
Raustiala and Victor, 2004; Oberthür and Stokke, 2011). Such in-
teractions can create interinstitutional conflict and tension that
inhibit and harm effective governance, but they can also create
synergy and result in complementary ‘divisions of labour’
(Biermann et al., 2009; Gehring and Faude, 2014; Oberthür, 2016).
They can themselves be shaped by purposive policy intervention,
referred to as ‘interplay management’ (Oberthür, 2009; Stokke,
2020) or ‘orchestration’ (Abbott et al., 2015).3
One of the key issues in the literature has been how to delimit
institutional complexes and the issue areas they capture. Scholars
have identified a variety of regime complexes of varying size and
scope in several fields (see discussion in Orsini et al., 2013; Gomez-
Mera et al., 2020). We here suggest a focus on a sectoral delimita-
tion of institutional complexes as a suitable approach for our pur-
pose of assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of global climate
governance.
2.2. Sectoral institutional complexes
To identify and delimit sectoral institutional complexes, we start
from sectoral systems according to social transition theory (see also
Victor et al., 2019). Each sectoral system provides identifiable so-
cietal functions such as transport, electricity, or raw materials for
industrial production and is constituted of ensembles of actors
(corporations, administrative bodies, political groups/parties, in-
ternational organisations), technologies and infrastructures, eco-
nomic structures, institutions and ideas that produce degrees of
path dependency and resistance to change (Geels and Schot, 2010).
Such systems are complex, which entails that (1) they can produce
emergent phenomena/effects that are more than the systems’
parts, and (2) they are open, i.e. closely related to and potentially
overlapping and interdependent with other sectoral systems (Page,
2010). Our societies and economies are supported by a patchwork
of such socio-technological systems. Their number tends to in-
crease with the advancing functional differentiation of modern
societies, which also entails that sectoral systems might be further
subdivided into various overlapping sectoral subsystems. For
example, relevant transport sub-sectors include land transport (by
train, car, others), sea/water transport, air transport, passenger
transport, freight transport, international transport (aviation and
maritime), urban transport, etc. As this example indicates, sectoral
systems can easily overlap (e.g., urban transport and passenger/
freight transport) (Page, 2010; Schot and Laur, 2018; see also Unruh,
2000; Harich, 2010; Borras and Edler, 2014).
On this basis, we can delimit sectoral institutional complexes of
global climate governance by identifying their components: the
intergovernmental and transnational institutions relevant for the
decarbonization of a given sectoral system. This includes both
overarching global institutions and more issue- or sector-specific
and/or regional institutions that explicitly pursue climate mitiga-
tion or otherwise affect mitigation efforts, either positively or
negatively. For example, the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement are
likely to form part of any sectoral institutional complex as the
overarching global institution on climate change, whereas the In-
ternational Renewable Energy Agency and the Renewable Energy
and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) may affect one or more
sectoral complexes as they promote carbon-free renewable energy.
Similarly, the WTO may have particular relevance for a number of
sectoral complexes, in part because its free-trade disciplines have
been found to hinder efforts to address carbon leakage concerns
(e.g., relating to energy-intensive industries). Mapping relevant
intergovernmental and transnational institutions onto sectoral
systems can hence serve to identify sectoral institutional
complexes.
Placing such sectoral institutional complexes center-stage has
the advantage of staying close to the actual challenges, barriers and
opportunities actors face in advancing the climate transition. GHG
emissions (and their mitigation) are ultimately the product of de-
cisions relating to new and existing buildings, transport in-
frastructures, industrial facilities, the acquisition of energy-
consuming appliances, urban planning, investments, etc. Actor
constellations, available technological solutions, existing in-
frastructures and corresponding path dependencies vary widely
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tions of barriers and opportunities of decarbonization. For example,
the decarbonization of energy-intensive industries requires the
development and diffusion of costly new breakthrough technolo-
gies under conditions of global competition by a limited number of
major companies and producer countries (see Oberthür et al., this
special issue). In contrast, technologies for the decarbonization of
the power sector are widely available and competitiveness con-
cerns only loom indirectly, whereas grid development, storage and
capital costs constitute major issues (Hermwille, this special issue).
Hence, the climate change problem takes politically and socially
different forms across the various socio-technical systems that
need to be transformed for the decarbonization of our economies
and societies. Our sectoral approach therefore aims to heed the
insight that effective governance requires institutional arrange-
ments that fit the structure of the problem (e.g., Young and Levy,
1999; Miles et al., 2002; Young, 2009).
Focusing on sectoral systems also brings the analysis closer to
actual decision-making on policies and investments. Public policies
are regularly developed in sectorally structured ministries. Private
actors, including corporate and civil-society actors, also act in
strongly sectoral socio-technical systems and organize themselves
accordingly (e.g., in related industry associations). Consequently,
climate policy e as a policy area cutting across many sectors e has
at the domestic level very much taken a sectoral approach.
Advanced domestic climate governance systems commonly include
a portfolio of targeted sectoral policies, even if embedded in an
overarching legal framework such as a principal climate change act
(e.g., Dupont and Oberthür, 2015; Iacobuta et al., 2018). This is not
to deny the existence of overarching or crosscutting action contexts
or the need for more integrated decision-making, but to recognize
that sectoral structures and contexts of decision-making have
remained a prominent and even prevalent feature of modern public
and private policy-making e as is apparent not least from the
continuing debate about the need for environmental and climate
policy integration (e.g., Jordan and Lenschow, 2010; Dupont, 2016).
Our delimitation of sectoral systems and related institutional
complexes overlaps with, but is distinct from, other established
distinctions of sectors that are not necessarily related to the actual
decision contexts of public and private actors. Hence, emission
sectors (as, for example, reflected in inventories under the UNFCCC)
or economic sectors (as may be reflected in macroeconomic ac-
counting) may, but do not necessarily, delimit meaningful decision
contexts. For example, the distinction between direct energy-
related emissions and process emissions of industry is hardly
socio-politically relevant in this sense; nor is a crude distinction
between manufacturing and services. Ministerial portfolios may be
closer to (and shape) relevant decision contexts, but usually
combine several relevant contexts and do so in ways that differ
across countries. Furthermore, they are known to face difficulties in
accounting for overlaps and cross-cutting issues that transcend
ministerial portfolios (hence the already noted challenge of inter-
ministerial coordination and policy integration).
The focus on sectoral institutional complexes is a novel way of
establishing a suitable middle ground. Existing literature has
largely either focused on individual institutions, on the overall
institutional complex, or on small groups of institutions relevant for
a particular sub-problem (e.g., Keohane and Victor, 2011; Abbott,
2012; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Graichen et al., 2016; Sanderink et al.,
2017; van der Ven et al., 2017; Hsu et al., 2018). While analysing
individual institutions only reveals a smaller part of the bigger
picture, the overall institutional landscape appears too wide a field
and does not allow to differentiate between varying barriers and
challenges across different sub-fields. Focusing on small groups of
institutions seems a suitable middle ground, but the definition of4
such institutional complexes has so far occurred ad hoc rather than
by applying a clear logic to systematically bring into view key
barriers and challenges. Our sectoral approach aggregates indi-
vidual institutions’ contributions into meaningful sectoral com-
plexes of global climate governance. It cuts the overall polycentric
governance landscape into meaningful groups of institutions that
co-govern particular sectoral systems. As a result, the key chal-
lenges and barriers to climate protection and what global climate
governance may contribute to addressing them come into focus.
In line with the primary purpose of our effort (namely to sys-
tematically assess the effectiveness and adequacy of global climate
governance), we focus on determining the overall contribution of
each sectoral complex to addressing the pertinent barriers and
challenges and advancing the decarbonization of the relevant sec-
toral system. As a result, our primary focus is not on clarifying the
relationship and interaction of the complex’ component in-
stitutions, otherwise a prime concern of research on institutional
complexes (see Gomez-Mera et al., 2020).We rather concentrate on
aggregating the components’ governance effects to determine the
complex’ overall performance and identify gaps and insufficiencies.
To be sure, interactions among the component institutions are not
ignored but duly considered, since inter-institutional synergy and
tensions/conflict can reinforce or weaken climate mitigation,
respectively. However, the inter-institutional connections them-
selves are not the central, let alone single, focus. The overall picture
emerging as a result also provides a sound basis for exploring how
to enhance the effectiveness of sectoral complexes through action
in the component institutions, improved coordination between
them, creation of new institutions or action in overarching fora.
Aggregating the effects of individual institutions towards sec-
toral complexes does not yet deliver an overall assessment of global
climate governance. Such an overall assessment would require an
aggregation of sectoral assessments, including due attention to
interdependencies and interlinkages across sectoral systems. It also
implies asking how (lack of) progress toward the climate transition
in one sectoral system affects other sectoral transformations (e.g.,
implications of electrification of transport and energy-intensive
industries for the power sector) and to what extent these in-
terdependencies are properly addressed. In so doing, we can derive
a more complete picture of the performance of global climate
governance more broadly. While the wider setting of global climate
governance can also be understood as an institutional complex
(e.g., Keohane and Victor, 2011; van Asselt and Zelli, 2018), we refer
to it here as the broader “governance landscape”, to distinguish it
from our sectoral institutional complexes.
3. Assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of international
governance institutions: five key functions
Assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of sectoral institu-
tional complexes requires three steps. First, it is foundational to
establish the main barriers and key challenges that efforts to
advance the climate transition face in each sectoral system, thereby
capturing the specific problem structure. On this basis, we can,
second, explore the need for and the potential of international in-
stitutions to address the identified barriers and challenges and
contribute to the climate transition of the sectoral system in focus
(as such international institutions are not necessarily suitable for
resolving any and all issues). Third, we can determine the actual
supply of global governance and compare it to the identified hy-
pothetical potential so as to derive how much of this potential has
been realised and how much scope for enhancing the contribution
of global governance remains, not least as a basis for thinking about
how the potential could be more fully exploited (Young, 2011; see
also section 5).
1 Please note that the international transparency at stake here differs from
transparency that may be pursued as a policy instrument, for example by infor-
mational policy instruments such as product labelling.
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fivemain governance functions that international institutions, both
intergovernmental and transnational, may in principle perform.
Building on the rich literature on international institutions, gover-
nance and cooperation (e.g., Young, 1999; Simmons and Martin,
2002; Andonova et al., 2009; Loorbach, 2010; Stokke, 2012;
Bulkeley et al., 2014; De Búrca et al., 2014), these reflect the
aforementioned double-nature of international institutions as both
normative systems and decision-making/communication processes
(Gehring, 1994). The five functions provide the basis for assessing
the potential and actual contribution of governance institutions to
the climate transition of the sectoral systems investigated. Going
much beyond a narrow understanding of climate change as a global
collective action problem (see also Aklin and Mildenberger, 2020;
Hale, 2020), they allow comparing the potential of international
institutions to the problem structure, and the actual performance of
the sectoral complex to this potential.
3.1. Guidance and signal
International institutions can provide guidance and signal to
members and other actors. This function derives mainly from an
institution’s principles and objectives. Frequently reflected in the
underlying treaty, statutes or related secondary decision-making,
international institutions are regularly established for a specific
purpose and with a particular objective (such as advancing free
trade, protecting human rights, limiting climate change, etc.). The
guidance and signal emanating therefrom can generate effects far
beyond the institution itself. By signalling the resolve of the in-
stitution’s members to pursue a certain course of action, likely
policy trajectories are indicated to business, investors and other
actors. As such, the signal and direction provided has the potential
to provide impetus to, and help synchronise and align de-
velopments across, different levels of governance (Kanie and
Biermann, 2017; Young, 2017). For example, the objectives of the
Paris Agreement have provided an important (though imperfect)
signal to business and others to pursue low- or zero-carbon
development (Morseletto et al., 2016; Falkner, 2016; Bodansky,
2017; Hermwille et al., 2017; see also the other special issue
articles).
3.2. Setting rules to facilitate collective action
International institutions can facilitate collective action by
setting rules. Members thus agree to certain reciprocal obligations
and standards of behaviour that can take different forms. They may
prohibit, prescribe or permit certain conduct and harmonise
(technical) standards, through a range of (environmental) policy
instruments including ‘command and control’ regulation, market-
based instruments, informational instruments, etc. (Jordan et al.,
2012; Sterner and Coria, 2013; Wurzel et al., 2013). The imple-
mentation of such obligations by individual parties is then expected
to trigger pertinent behavioural effects. Various transnational in-
stitutions are considered to possess a strong regulatory component
(e.g., Andonova et al., 2009; Abbott, 2012; Roger et al., 2017).
The need for international rules grows with the level of inter-
national interdependence. Some problems may not require inter-
national cooperation at all (e.g., reform of local public
administrations). In other cases, actors’ behaviour is contingent on
each other to varying degrees. For example, restricting industrial
GHG emissions may imply direct or indirect costs to industry that
affect its international competitiveness (see also Oberthür et al.,
this special issue). Under such circumstances, international rules
can facilitate collective action by levelling the playing field.
Agreement on such rules regularly requires ‘burden-sharing’5
arrangements to address related distributional issues. Hence, actors
not only need to understand the benefits of collective action, but
also consider their respective contributions to be fair and equitable
(e.g., Levy et al., 1995; Hasenclever et al., 1997).
3.3. Transparency and accountability
International institutions frequently enhance the transparency
of their parties’ actions and hold parties to account for any imple-
mentation deficits. We refer to this as their ‘transparency and
accountability’ function.1 Institutions’ secretariats may either
themselves collect relevant data or receive reports from individual
parties. On this basis, the institution may engage in a review of the
quality and comparability of submitted data and of parties’ imple-
mentation (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). The effort required may
depend on the activities regulated. For example, emissions from
large point sources like power stations may be easier to verify than
the carbon uptake by forests. International institutions can
furthermore entail specific mechanisms for addressing any imple-
mentation deficits identified (Keohane et al., 2000), such as the
compliance procedures that commonly form part of modern
multilateral environmental agreements (Bulmer, 2012).
High levels of transparency and accountability generally
encourage effective implementation. Whereas the relationship
with effectiveness is not necessarily straight-forward (Gupta and
van Asselt, 2019), transparency and accountability are widely held
to enhance trust, provide reassurance to parties, facilitate
acknowledgement of efforts, and promote learning and common
understanding (Mitchell, 1998; Bodansky, 2010; Park and Kramarz,
2019). They hence closely inter-relate with the functions of rule-
setting and knowledge and learning (see below). If rule-setting
addresses ‘coordination problems’ that entail an incentive for all
parties to comply, less oversight and verification are required than
for ‘cooperation problems’ involving mixed motives of actors and
consequently an incentive to ‘free-ride’ (Snidal, 1985). Furthermore,
efforts at enhancing transparency can generate crucial data and
knowledge. Transparency and accountability also interrelate with
actors’ willingness to accept ambitious obligations (Bodansky,
2012) and are frequently themselves highly politicised e as
evident from related discussions under the UN climate regime
(Dagnet and Levin, 2017; Levin, 2018; Oberthür and Northrop,
2018).
3.4. Capacity building, technology and finance (means of
implementation)
The provision of capacity building, technology, and financial
resources is a further key function, particularly relevant in a North-
South context. Developing countries, who generally bear less re-
sponsibility for global environmental problems than developed
countries, frequently lack these means of implementation (Chayes
and Chayes, 1993). Accordingly, various international financial in-
stitutions and mechanisms provide means of implementation,
including theWorld Bank, several Multilateral Development Banks,
the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, as well as
initiatives of private financial institutions (Keohane and Levy, 1996;
Bodansky, 2010; UNFCCC, 2019).
The rationale for providing such means of implementation
through international institutions is at least twofold. While bilat-
eral channels and the private sector are important sources,
Table 1
Overview of main functions of international governance institutions.
Functions Key features Main added value
Guidance & Signal  Results from overall agreement, including targets/objectives  Aligns actors across countries
Setting Rules  Various forms of obligations and standards  Enables action by addressing interdependence &
competitiveness concerns
Transparency & Accountability  Reporting, review/verification, compliance  Contributes to effective reciprocity and implementation
(addressing free riding) & mutual trust
Means of Implementation  Capacity building, technology transfer and finance
(North-South)
 Facilitates pooling of donors/investors’ resources and reducing
transaction costs
Knowledge & Learning  Generation and collective appraisal of information/knowledge
 Science and policy learning
 Improved and shared understanding (authoritative
knowledge)
 Improved policies (learning)
Source: Authors’ own compilation (Oberthür et al., 2017).
S. Oberthür, L. Hermwille and T. Rayner Earth System Governance 8 (2021) 100104international cooperation allows donors/investors to coordinate
and thereby address the second-order collective-action problem of
who is to contribute how much to the overall effort. Furthermore,
international cooperation helps reduce ‘transaction costs’ in
addressing various countries and contexts that face similar issues
and require similar expertise. In short, international cooperation
allows resources to be pooled and duplication of effort to be
minimised (Keohane and Levy, 1996).
3.5. Knowledge and learning
Finally, international institutions can enhance knowledge and
learning in various ways. They may collect, aggregate and dissem-
inate relevant data/information and other knowledge about sci-
entific, economic, technical and policy problems and solutions (e.g.,
the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook and the
UN Environment Programme’s Global Environment Outlook). Ac-
tors may also decide to engage in a collective appraisal of available
knowledge, be it through separate international institutions (e.g.,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) or in separate
processes within a broader institution (e.g., the assessment panels
of the Montreal Protocol; Parson, 2003). As mentioned, mecha-
nisms to provide for transparency may also generate relevant
knowledge. The knowledge generated may itself foster learning
and awareness raising, but learning may also emanate from ex-
change and discussion within international institutions, for
example on best practices (Haas, 1990; Hasenclever et al., 1997;
Young and Levy, 1999).
Knowledge and learning may help advance both the imple-
mentation by individual actors and the international process. They
may lead actors to re-interpret their interests and adapt their pol-
icies. The general authority of the institution in question (such as
the International Energy Agency, IEA, onmatters of energy) and the
process of collective appraisal support the acceptance of knowledge
and information (see also Mitchell et al., 2006). The resulting
consensual knowledge can in turn help advance international po-
litical discussions since it provides common ground and frames
policy options (Gehring, 2007).
3.6. The governance functions in overview
The five functions distinguished indicate the governance po-
tential of international institutions: any specific international
institution may fulfil one or several of these functions to varying
degrees. In other words, to what extent any specific international
institution or set of institutions performs each governance function
is an empirical question. Table 1 provides an overview of the key
features and main added value of the five governance functions.
The five key governance functions capture first-order effects of
international institutions that are closely linked to the outputs they6
produce, as discussed in the literature. These outputs may include
various documents (treaties, decisions, scientific assessments, etc.)
and processes (e.g., joint deliberations and discussions). Staying
close to these outputs allows us to trace how institutions can
concretely affect relevant behaviour: how specific rules, norms and
processes of international institutions may concretely enable actors
to advance emission mitigation. Broader second-order effects (such
as the creation of general ‘benefits’ or ‘wealth’) that may follow
from the five first-order functions are not considered, as they are
beyond our focus on climate mitigation.
4. Limitations
Panaceas, or best approaches, for studying social phenomena
such as global climate governance are elusive. Each approach
typically has specific potentials and limitations. Having presented
the potential of the sectoral approach above, we here discuss four
limitations and trade-offs that in particular follow from the inter-
mediate range of the approach (see for further relevant lessons
from the application of the approach, Rayner et al., this special
issue).
First, by dissecting the global climate governance landscape into
several sectoral complexes, the proposed approach may be
considered ‘reductionist’. Although the sectoral approach goes
beyond an analysis of individual institutions, it brings only parts of
the overall institutional complex into focus, namely groups of
governance institutions co-governing specific sectoral systems.
Like other reductionist approaches, it hence runs the risk of losing
sight of the bigger whole and of important interdependencies and
interlinkages between the different complexes. For example, the
climate transition of the transport and broader energy sector is set
to have repercussions on international transport (by reducing the
demand for shipping of coal and oil), thereby affecting this sectoral
system’s contribution to GHG emissions and the urgency and op-
tions for its decarbonization (Walsh et al., 2017, 32; Rayner, this
special issue). Similarly, pursuing the decarbonization of energy-
intensive industries, transport and buildings through electrifica-
tion has important ramifications for the development of a decar-
bonized power sector (Rayner et al., 2018; Oberthür et al., this
special issue; Obergassel et al., this special issue). The reduc-
tionist fallacy can be significantly mitigated by (1) aggregating the
results of the sectoral analyses and (2) systematically reflecting on
the cross-sectoral interdependencies and interlinkages in the sec-
toral analyses (see also section 2.2).
Second, and related, the sectoral framing carries the risk of
masking important social systems not typically viewed as ‘sectors’.
For example, finance and investment has traditionally not been
considered a sector and indeed requires us to go beyond the
‘financial industry’ and include regulatory and other aspects in
order to grasp their full significance as a key system for the climate
2 A sixth field e finance and investment e was analyzed but could not be
included in the special issue; see Rayner et al. (2018).
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tend to leave important options for addressing climate change, such
as negative emission technologies, concepts of de- or post-growth,
circular economy, contraception and family planning, out of focus.
However, to the extent that these options assemble identifiable
ensembles of actors, technologies and infrastructures, economic
structures, institutions and ideas (see section 2.2), it is possible to
employ the sectoral approach in order to analyse them as
(emerging) sectoral systems. Particular attention may be required,
though, to ensure cross-cutting issues do not fall through the cracks
when identifying relevant sectoral systems.
Third, and in contrast to the previous points, a sectoral system
approach necessarily limits the amount of detailed analysis of in-
dividual institutions. As the approach explores medium-sized
groups of institutions, the analysis cannot go into as much depth
as case studies of particular institutions could. Unless we can build
on other studies that address the institutions concerned in more
detail, the analysis will inevitably lose out on detail and hence,
possibly, nuance.
Finally, we wish to acknowledge two limitations of the scope of
our analysis. First of all, as we focus on global, transboundary
governance, we do not consider options for advancing the climate
transition at other levels of multilevel governance. The sectoral
approach developed here focuses on the specific potential of global
governance to advance the decarbonization of particular sectoral
systems e realising that this potential may rarely suffice. We leave
to future research the exploration of what overall action at different
levels of governance might be needed for the full climate transition
of the selected sectoral systems (see Rayner et al., this special issue).
In addition, our analysis only addresses a select number of sectoral
systems and hence does not cover the full scope of sectoral systems
relevant for the deep decarbonization of the complete economy.
Overall, the sectoral approach developed here necessarily
strikes a balance. Focusing on institutional complexes governing
sectoral systems allows us to mitigate some of the shortcomings of
exploring either individual institutions (not seeing the forest for the
trees) or global climate governance as a whole (neglecting the
details). We hence suggest that the intermediate sectoral approach
proposed here can make a significant contribution to a better un-
derstanding of the theoretical and actual potential of global
governance to help mitigate climate change. This should provide a
sound basis for identifying areas for improvement, which is much
needed for retaining a chance of limiting global temperature in-
crease to 2 C, let alone 1.5 C.
5. Operationalisation and overview of the special issue
From the potentially very large number of sectoral systems and
related institutional complexes, choices of where to focus need to
be made, based on clear criteria. In a first step, for our purposes it
seems reasonable to focus on relatively broad sectoral systems that
are known to contribute significantly to global GHG emissions or to
be particularly relevant for efforts to address such emissions. A
second useful criterion may be a significant potential for global
governance to advance the sector’s climate transition. Thirdly, we
may aim to avoid excessive overlap between systems selected for
in-depth analysis.
We have used these criteria to select five sectoral systems for
further analysis in this special issue. We first selected 14 prominent
sectoral systems for which we analyzed the barriers, the potential
of international cooperation andmapped the relevant international
institutions (Oberthür et al., 2017). Subsequently, we narrowed this
selection down for the in-depth analysis of the supply of global
governance, the resulting gaps and existing policy options in the
five key sectoral systems covered here, namely fossil-fuel extractive7
industries, power generation, energy-intensive industries, land
transport, and international transport.2 We do not claim that the
selected sectoral systems are necessarily the most important ones,
nor that they together provide a complete or representative picture.
We do hold, however, that they figure prominently in the climate
transition, are significant and can serve to illustrate how a sectoral
approach to global climate governance can be applied and adds
value. Taken together, their analysis allows us to gain a broader
picture of the contribution of global governance to the climate
transition.
To tease out to what extent existing international institutions
exploit the potential of international cooperation to advance the
climate transition in each sectoral system, each study in principle
contains four elements. First is the identification of the main bar-
riers and key challenges to the climate transition: economic (costs,
competitiveness, access to capital), technological, political and
institutional barriers, and barriers related to a lack of knowledge
and awareness (of the problems themselves or of available tech-
nological and policy solutions). Second, the sectoral studies explore
the potential of international institutions to address the identified
barriers and challenges, given the five main functions international
institutions can perform (see section 3). The analysis thereby
identifies the specific need for and potential of international in-
stitutions to contribute to the climate transition of the sectoral
system in focus.
Third, the actual supply of global governance is assessed and
compared to the identified hypothetical potential. To lay the basis,
the relevant international institutions are mapped, drawing on
existing databases of international institutions, complemented by
our own research taking into account available secondary literature
and expert review (Rayner et al., 2018, esp. 15e18). For each of the
identified institutions, we assess to what extent they contribute to,
or hinder, the performance of the governance functions found to be
most critical to decarbonization. In order to arrive at an overall
assessment, the results for all institutions included are then
aggregated (taking due account of any overlaps and conflicts) and
compared to the previously derived hypothetical needs and po-
tentials of international cooperation so as to identify any gaps, i.e.
unmet governance needs or underexploited governance potentials.
We distinguish three approximate levels of governance supply,
namely high (governance needs/potential are largelymet), medium
(partially met), and low (largely unmet). Throughout this analysis,
as mentioned above, we aim to pay systematic attention to in-
terdependencies and interlinkages across sectoral systems.
Fourth, this analysis provides a solid starting point for thinking
about options for filling the identified gaps and enhancing the
contribution of global governance. We start exploring whether
existing institutions could, given their mandate, be reformed to
enhance their performance and contribution, and what the added
value of any new institutions in the governance landscape could be,
including what their membership and focus might usefully be.
Where existing or new institutions overlap or even conflict with
each other, options for better coordinating or orchestrating the
‘concert’ of institutions can be considered. While this constitutes
only a first, explorative identification of available fora and general
options, we hope that it can provide a solid basis for more detailed
future assessment andweighing of options, in view of their political
feasibility and costs, which is beyond the scope of our current ef-
forts (see also Rayner et al., this special issue).
This special issue aims to develop and put to the test a sectoral
approach to global climate governance. After this scene-setting
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governance in the aforementioned five key sectoral systems. Sub-
sequently, we synthesize the main lessons learned from our
application of the sectoral approach. The special issue is rounded
off with some broader reflections on this approach in assessing the
adequacy of the global response to the Paris Agreement.
Tim Rayner analyses the current and potential contribution of
global governance to addressing increasing concerns over fossil fuel
(over) supply. With many economies heavily reliant on fossil-fuel
extractive industries, steps to curtail supply raise significant ques-
tions of equity and justice. Despite increasing rhetorical commit-
ments (for example on the need to reduce subsidies), existing inter-
or transnational institutions meet critical governance needs only to
a limited degree. Potentials are not exploited, while conflicting
objectives continue to be pursued. Options for enhancing global
governance, including in institutions such as the World Trade Or-
ganization, the G20, and the UNFCCC, as well as potential smaller
‘coalitions of the willing’, are identified. The importance of
addressing supply issues through institutions covering develop-
ment cooperation and governance of finance is also noted.
Lukas Hermwille investigates the global governance of power
production/electricity generation. He identifies a wide range of
inter- and transnational governance institutions that address
various aspects of the sectoral transformation challenges related to
the integration of increasing shares of fluctuating renewable en-
ergy, the development of grid infrastructure, the mobilization and
de-risking of massive renewable energy investments, competi-
tiveness concerns, and related distributive effects. Existing inter-
national institutions meet the governance needs to some extent,
particularly with respect to the deployment of renewable energy.
However, the phase-out of oil and gas in electricity generation re-
mains an important blind spot. The IEA is highlighted as a partic-
ularly pertinent point of departure to optimize the supply of global
governance and fill the identified gap.
The global governance of energy-intensive industries is the
focus of the analysis by Sebastian Oberthür, Gauri Khandekar and
Tomas Wyns. Global governance of the climate transition of these
industries has a strong rationale, since international competition is
fierce and costs are a major barrier to decarbonization. As a limited
number of countries and usually multinational companies domi-
nate most relevant industries (steel, aluminum, chemicals,
cement), conditions for international cooperation are relatively
favorable. Nevertheless, the supply of global governance for the
climate transition has remained scarce so far. Fora for international
cooperation are in short supply and structures for firm interna-
tional regulation non-existent. Building up such structures e
including both relevant countries and industrial players e has a
high potential and is urgently required.
Wolfgang Obergassel, Oliver Lah and Frederic Rudolph bring
global governance of land transport into focus. Passenger and
freight transport are among the fastest growing GHG emission
sources, which international cooperation could help address in
various ways. The supply of global governance involves a multitude
of intergovernmental and transnational institutions and initiatives.
This institutional complex conspicuously lacks a center of gravity,
and succeeds neither in meeting the need for, nor exploiting the
potential of, international cooperation to advance the climate
transition. Supply of global governance is stronger with respect to
knowledge and learning than in providing clear guidance, estab-
lishing supporting regulatory frameworks, promoting transparency
and mobilizing means of implementation. Hence, there remains
enormous potential to strengthen global governance of transport’s
climate transition through mandating the establishment of emis-
sion targets, policies and measures as well as transparency pro-
visions at sector level.8
In focusing on international transport, Tim Rayner notes the
urgent need for, but also the major barriers to, decarbonization of
aviation and shipping. The need and potential for global climate
governance to address these issues varies across both sectors, given
different industry structures and characteristics. The International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO) are themain focus, but non-state activity also has
significant potential in the shipping sector, especially if better
orchestrated. Overall, the shipping sector has shown considerably
more seriousness in addressing GHG emissions, although effective
implementation remains to be ensured. In the aviation sector,
reliance on ‘offsets’ and future techno-fixes while demand growth
remains unmanaged, is cause for concern. Better coordination be-
tween the UNFCCC and IMO and ICAO respectively is identified as a
short-term priority, along with more effective mechanisms to
finance R&D and incentivise investment.
A concluding, synthesizing paper by Tim Rayner, Sebastian
Oberthür and Lukas Hermwille sets out key findings, takes stock
and outlines possible resultant research priorities. Overall, the
application of our sectoral approach reveals that the need and
potential for global governance to contribute to effective climate
protection varies significantly across sectoral systems. The role
played by the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement in addressing sector-
specific challenges and advancing sectoral governance is impor-
tant but often relatively limited. Strong signals that certain high-
carbon activities need to be actively phased out (as opposed to
alternatives phased in) are found to be missing in particular in
power, fossil-fuel extractive industry and transport-related sectoral
systems. The setting of rules to facilitate collective action generally
seems in shortest supply, whereas the supply of ‘learning and
knowledge building’ and means of implementation varies across
sectoral systems. Finally, in view of the gaps identified, the paper
reflects on some implications for the UNFCCC, G20 and other
leading institutions.
Finally, Marta Torres Gunfaus and Henri Waisman reflect in a
shorter commentary on the contribution of the special issue to a
fuller assessment of the adequacy of the global response tomeeting
the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals. They argue that the sectoral
approach developed here provides a useful steppingstone towards
multidimensional adequacy assessments that eventually need to
integrate multiple levels of governance and short- and long-term
time horizons. This leads them to highlight priorities for the
design of the Global Stocktake and the further elaboration of
countries’ long-term strategies under the Paris Agreement.
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